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Abstract 
In this paper we adopt Sterelny’s (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related 
dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just 
cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the 
scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the “extended-mind” view, we 
illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items 
of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical 
evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and 
develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we 
experience the world in affectivity.  
 
1. Sterelny’s Scaffolded Mind  
 
Sterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This 
term refers to the idea that the mind is “environmentally supported,” more specifically that 
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cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive 
abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 
2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out 
environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the 
environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the 
organism’s chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building 
activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn 
affects the beaver’s behavior and that of its progeny.  
 Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For 
example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, 
nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a 
form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective 
landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic 
niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive 
tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, 
mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the 
human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a 
particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what 
Sterenly calls “intergenerational social learning”; see also Sterelny, 2012). 
 Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind 
view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated 
by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;	  Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes 
the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, 
but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, but he thinks that the 
niche-constructivist framework is more general, and thus more powerful, than the extended-
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mind framework. ExM focuses mainly on how single agents rely on their interactions with 
informational items to enhance their cognitive capacities. Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) central 
example is that of one person, Otto, who carries a notebook in which he annotates important 
information he would otherwise forget, and which he consults whenever he needs to. The 
argument for ExM relies on the observation that the functional role of Otto’s notebook is the 
same as the internal neural memory system of someone who does not rely on the notebook 
and is able to recall relevant information without external aids. Like information in a 
biological memory system, the information in Otto’s notebook is easily and directly accessed, 
and is generally not doubted or questioned. Just as we regard some internal brain processes as 
constitutive of memory, the argument goes, we should likewise regard Otto’s notebook as 
part of his memory.  
 Sterelny’s (2010) main criticism of ExM is that it is too narrow, and as such it 
“obscures rather than highlights” (p. 473) the varieties of ways in which we engineer the 
environment and rely on external resources to enhance our cognitive competences. In his 
view, activities that extend the mind are best seen instead as special cases of the more general 
phenomenon of environmentally supported cognition. This more general phenomenon need 
not always involve the robust use of highly trusted resources, for example; nor does it have to 
concern the interaction between a resource and a single agent only. Once one acknowledges 
the widespread presence of “environmental fuels for cognition” (p. 473), the critical task 
according to Sterelny is to identify functional relationships between agents and 
environmental resources, and to plot them as dimensions in a multi-dimensional space. He 
identifies three such dimensions: the extent to which an agent trusts a resource; the extent to 
which a resource is entrenched and individualized; and the extent to which a resource is 
shared across more than one agent (we illustrate these in more detail in the next section).  
4	  
	  
 Sterelny maintains that this dimensional framework does not force categorical 
distinctions on nature; thus “the boundary between external components of the agent’s mind 
and mere resources for that mind must be arbitrary” (p. 480). ExM, in this framework, “is one 
corner in a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence” (ibid.); 
specifically, canonical extended mind cases are those that involve single individuals 
manipulating highly trusted and entrenched resources. Although “no clear error is made in 
reserving a special label for this region of space” (ibid.), focusing only on that region is not 
helpful because it obscures many other instantiations and features of the scaffolded mind.  
 We find Sterelny’s approach to ExM particularly appealing for two main reasons. 
First, it circumvents the frustrating dispute between supporters and detractors of ExM 
revolving around what is known as the “causal-constitution fallacy.” Detractors of ExM have 
argued that whereas it is certainly important to recognize the role of the environment in 
enhancing cognitive activities, this role is merely causal, not one of constitution (e.g., Adams 
& Aizawa, 2001). Relatedly, others have argued that it is better (because it is more 
conservative) to claim that cognition is “embedded” rather than extended, that is, causally 
interacting with the world but still firmly located within the organism (Rupert, 2004).  
 Clark (2008, p. 138) himself characterizes the “argumentative oscillation” between 
the theses of the extended and embedded mind as “unproductive.” As Sprevak (2010) has 
pointed out, the explanatory value to cognitive science of the two theses is very similar. Our 
view is that, because of the different intuitions that individuals have regarding the nature of 
the mind, this debate cannot progress much beyond the formulation of criteria supporting one 
intuition over another, and their subsequent rejection by those who do not share the same 
intuition. We see Sterelny’s notion of the scaffolded mind as useful for avoiding this 
deadlock, and at the same time as providing conceptual tools for productively highlighting 
the transformative powers of environmental scaffolds. Supporters of both the extended and 
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embedded thesis can agree with Sterelny that the mind is pervasively scaffolded, and thus 
that the environment cannot be excluded from our best explanations of cognition. As for the 
ontological question of when, if ever, the environment comes to be part of cognition—this is 
not something that a supporter of the scaffolded approach needs to provide an answer to. 
Sterelny (2010) sees the extended mind as a limiting case of the scaffolded mind: “canonical 
extended mind cases are continuous with other cases, cases in which there is environmental 
support of cognition, but which are not plausibly treated as constituents of agents’ minds” (p. 
466). This is an intermediate position along a dimension of other possible stances, all 
compatible, in our interpretation, with the niche-construction/scaffolded-mind model. At one 
extreme of this dimension is the internalist position according to which the mind supervenes 
on the brain only (e.g., Searle, 1992; Adams & Aizawa, 2001); at the other extreme is the 
externalist view according to which the mind is always necessarily constituted by the 
environment (Hutto & Myin, 2013).  
 The second reason why we find Sterelny’s framework appealing is that it can be used 
to highlight the many ways in which the environment scaffolds not just the mind’s cognitive 
capabilities but also its affective ones. His framework can thus be used to expand on the 
recent “situated” approach to emotion, advanced by Griffiths & Scarantino (2009). Drawing 
on interpersonal accounts of emotion in psychology (esp. Parkinson et al., 2005), Griffiths 
and Scarantino offer a different perspective from the widespread one according to which 
emotions are internal states of the organism with the function of providing information about 
the significance of situations. They argue, rather, that emotions are social signals designed to 
change the behavior of other organisms. As such, emotions are often non-conceptual skilful 
engagements with the world that influence other organisms and are influenced by them. 
Griffiths and Scarantino also mention that emotions are culturally scaffolded, both 
diachronically by sociocultural norms, and synchronically by the concrete, material context 
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with which one interacts. In our view, mapping Sterelny’s framework onto the affective 
domain can enrich this account. Our goal in this paper is therefore to undertake this mapping, 
and in so doing provide further distinctions and detail to the situated view of affectivity.1 In 
addition, this exercise will importantly reveal the extent to which affectivity is not just a 
matter of passively undergoing bodily and experiential changes, but also of actively 
modifying one’s environment for the sake of one’s affective life itself (to sustain, amplify, 
dampen it, etc.). This active dimension, we think, is an important feature of affectivity that 
needs emphasizing. Griffiths and Scarantino point out primarily that our emotions depend on 
the sociocultural context. We will highlight, in addition, that affective states involve the 
active manipulation of the world, and that this process leads to the existence of what we shall 
call affective niches: instances of organism-environment couplings (mutual influences) that 
enable the realization of specific affective states. This active manipulation need not be the 
product of a conscious intention, although it can be; it is often just part of our repertoire of 
habitual dealings with the world. One important implication of our discussion, if we are right, 
is that understanding and explaining affective phenomena needs to take into consideration the 
ways in which agents engineer their affective environments (i.e., create affective niches) and 
in so doing let these environments influence their affective states in an ongoing way.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize Sterelny’s 
(2010) account of the dimensions of the scaffolded mind. In subsequent sections we apply it 
to the realm of affectivity, discussing material (section 3) and interpersonal (section 4) 
scaffoldings, as well as their interaction (section 5). 
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2. Dimensions of the Scaffolded Mind 
  
Sterelny (2010) identifies three dimensions of the scaffolded mind. These are not meant to be 
the only dimensions along which the scaffolded mind varies, but they arguably provide a 
useful initial analytic tool.2 The first dimension he discusses is trust (pp. 473-475). Trust 
refers to the agent’s perception of the reliability of a certain environmental resource and of 
her access to it. Some resources, and access to them, are regarded as more reliable than 
others; some are automatically trusted, whereas others are used in a more guarded way. For 
example, we rely unreflectively on the campus map when we need to get to a lecture room, 
whereas we are more wary of health advice posted on alternative medicine websites. 
Generally, Sterelny thinks that resources that involve only one sender and one receiver are (or 
ought to be) less trusted than publicly displayed resources with a record of reliability.  
 The second dimension is individualization or entrenchment (pp. 475-477). Some 
resources—such as the set of knives of a professional cook—become highly individualized 
over time and with repeated use. The agent herself changes during the course of this 
individualization process as she gets attuned to a certain resource, and to the modifications 
that the resource goes through as a consequence of use. Although Sterelny does not use this 
term, phenomenologists would talk of the transparency of an entrenched or individualized 
resource (e.g., De Preester, 2011). A certain resource becomes transparent in its use when it is 
not noted anymore, or when it is noted but not in the same way as objects normally are; 
rather, it becomes incorporated into one’s acting self. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) famously 
talked of the integration of tools (e.g., the blind person’s cane) into one’s corporeal schema 
(schéma corporel)—the set of tacit skills that characterize action in the world, and which 
structure one’s experience—in virtue of the role they play in supporting habitual actions. 
From a dimensional perspective, it is useful to think of entrenchment in terms of a 
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continuum, rather than all or nothing. Some resources are more entrenched and transparent 
than others, depending on degree of expertise—compare how effortlessly a professional 
tennis player uses her racket, for example, versus an amateur handling it for the first time—
and also on whether the resource is a tool or another person (see section 4.2). 
 The third dimension (Sterelny, 2010, pp. 477-479) refers to the degree to which the 
resource at stake is employed by an individual, or is, rather, collective. ExM focuses 
primarily on cases of single individuals interacting with informational tools (notebooks, 
computers, calculators, etc.). Yet as Sterelny notes, one can find many cases of 
environmentally scaffolded capacities that involve interactions of various individuals with 
collectively structured environments. Sterelny refers to Tribble’s (2005) study of Elizabethan 
and Jacobean theatre, and in particular the methods actors employed to master, in a short time 
span, a very large number of parts, typically performed after very little rehearsal. An 
important element were the plots: two-dimensional maps of the play attached on stage, used 
in conjunction with the parts. Players did not have the full text, so the plots allowed them to 
chart the play, and particularly to understand the rhythm of the scenes. Plots and other 
devices thus enabled the actors to rely on a variety of environmental cues to act out their 
parts, without the need to memorize details such as entrances, exits, and order of the scene; 
this in turn freed up cognitive resources for the memorization of lines. This example nicely 
illustrates what others have called distributed cognition (e.g., Hutchins, 1995). What is 
important for our purposes is that the various environmental items in this example have not 
been adapted to a single individual (as in the previous example of the professional cook’s 
knives), but to a group.  
 Let us consider now how these dimensions apply not just to cognitive but also to 
affective states. 
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3. Material Scaffoldings of Affectivity 
 
One need not think too hard to come across several examples of how we manipulate the 
material world to alter our affective condition: we take Prozac for depression, listen to music 
to relive past emotions, go to the movies to be entertained, indulge in comfort food, move 
furniture around for novelty, and so on. Sterelny’s framework, however, enables us to look at 
this phenomenon in more detail. 
 
3.1.   Trust 
Consider first the dimension of trust. Just as in the case of cognitive resources, we also trust 
some affective resources more than others. However, note that the sense of “trust” at stake 
here is different from the one at play in the case of cognition. To trust a cognitive resource is 
mainly to trust that it tells the truth about the world (think of Otto’s notebook, or the campus 
map) and accordingly that, for example, it will get us to where we need to go. Drawing 
attention to the affective function of environmental resources interestingly brings to light a 
different sense of “trust”: some resources are trusted in the sense that we are confident that 
they will have a certain effect on our affective state (e.g., make us happy or relaxed).  
At one end of this dimension are affective resources that are relied on only 
occasionally, but are not trusted tools for affective modulation. The occasional vacation may 
act as an affective scaffold by cheering us up without being regularly relied upon for 
regulating our mood. At the other end of this dimension are resources to which we are 
addicted, namely that we regard as indispensable for the realization of specific affective states 
(typically pleasant ones), and that we regularly employ for that purpose. Between these two 
poles are resources that are also regularly manipulated and trusted for the achievement of 
certain affective conditions (the boundary between these cases and cases of addiction is 
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arguably fuzzy). A prevalent example is provided by increasingly portable technologies for 
listening to music, which people often rely on to feel more energetic and enthusiastic, to 
unwind and relax, create a romantic atmosphere, or rekindle past experiences (e.g., DeNora, 
2000; Krause & Hargreaves, 2013). Importantly, music does not simply elicit emotions; 
thanks to its temporal character, music helps vent or give voice to emotions, “articulating” 
them as the music unfolds (DeNora, 2000). It is thus possible to say that we let music take the 
lead in shaping our affective states; we delegate the task of regulating certain features of our 
emotions to music (Krueger, 2014). How music regulates our affective states is an empirical 
question. One possibility is that music affects the body (facial expressions, gestures, 
physiology), which in turn is likely to affect the experience of emotion via bodily feedback. 
Some also argue that we perceive music as articulating dynamics akin to human expressions, 
and in so doing involuntarily create a motor representation of the emotion within ourselves, 
which then leads to a cascade of autonomic and somatic responses generating the associated 
emotion (see Krueger, 2014, for further references and discussion). In any case, what we 
want to emphasize here is the phenomenon of widespread reliance (trust) on technologies for 
music reproduction for the purpose of emotion regulation. Note that this purpose need not 
always be explicit or deliberate. Many of us have just got into the habit of relying on music to 
affect our moods. Think for example how common it is for many people to switch on the 
radio as they start the car’s engine, and have music in the background for the whole drive; or 
consider how difficult the prospect of a workout becomes when, after arriving at the gym, we 
discover that the battery of our mp3 player has died and we no longer have a soundtrack to 
push us through a workout (Lim et al., 2009). 
Consider also the role that other everyday items of material culture play in our lives, 
by acting on different aspects or “components” of our affective states—such as bodily 
processes (typically changes in autonomic nervous system activity, expression, and 
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behavior), action readiness (dispositions or tendencies to act in specific ways), cognitive 
evaluations or “appraisals,” and feelings or phenomenal experiences (e.g., see Scherer, 2009, 
for a detailed discussion of these components). For example, many people wear brightly 
colored clothes to contrast the dullness of rainy days, or choose soft items of clothing (e.g., a 
furry sweater) when they want to feel safe or cozy (see Kwon, 1991, for gender differences in 
mood-dependent cloth selection). There is indeed evidence that color affects mood (Valdez & 
Mehrabian, 1994), and the tactile qualities of the furry sweater may contribute to releasing 
chemicals known to lower stress levels. Consider also the work of the sociologist Jean-
Claude Kaufmann (2011), who found that the handbag a woman chooses to carry is neither 
simply an accessory for expressing individual style nor a utilitarian receptacle for toting 
around various practical tools (mobile phone, keys, tissues, etc.). A handbag—including its 
contents—functions as a highly portable, self-styled collection of technologies specifically 
chosen for regulating affect: charms and tokens for good luck and peace of mind, which 
influence one’s appraisal of, and ability to cope with, specific situations; photos, assorted 
mementos (such as old theatre tickets and restaurant receipts), snippets of notes and letters 
from loved ones that bring about fond memories of individuals and elicit specific feelings; 
also small weapons or tools that affect one’s awareness of one’s action possibilities, and 
accordingly generate feelings of confidence, power, and security.  
Note that although portability certainly makes it particularly easy for an item to 
become a trusted source of affective regulation, we do not only trust portable items for this 
purpose. Material items such as cinemas, concert halls and art galleries are non-portable 
resources that one can nevertheless regularly exploit to keep oneself interested and 
stimulated. Similarly, people for whom nature has a reliably calming and invigorating effect 
can count on the regular practice of outdoor activities to keep themselves in a generally good 
mood. Unlike playing music or choosing a specific outfit, however, these are cases where 
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agents do not directly manipulate the environment in order to alter their affective state. 
Nevertheless, they still actively select specific activities and interactions with the material 
world for precisely that purpose. The main feature of these activities and interactions is not 
portability but accessibility, which is in effect what portability typically enhances.  
 
3.2. Individualization and Entrenchment 
The dimension of individualization, we have seen, refers to the degree to which a resource 
has been adapted to one’s purposes and regular activities. As we illustrate now, not just 
cognitive but also affective states can include highly individualized material resources. These 
are usually also highly trusted resources, i.e., resources taken to have a reliable effect on 
one’s affective state. This is because the more one trusts, and accordingly relies on, a certain 
resource, the more individualized it becomes; vice versa, the more individualized and thus 
entrenched the resource is, the more trusted and relied upon it becomes.  
 Perhaps the best example of a highly individualized and entrenched affective resource 
is the way a professional musician relates to her instrument. Learning to play requires years 
of practice, usually from a very young age, during which one’s brain and body gradually 
adapt to the instrument—its shape, sound, and expressive range. Learning to play thus 
involves the development of specific bodily skills to achieve a high degree of motoric 
mastery over the instrument; at the same time, the musician uses her instrument to express 
and explore a variety of feelings via daily practice sessions. The instrument thus gradually 
becomes entrenched not just in the musician’s motoric repertoire, but also in her repertoire of 
expression and feeling. Indeed, musicians often experience a strong sense of attachment to 
their instrument, feeling that the instrument is part of them; losing access to an instrument 
played from a young age can be a source of deep regret and sadness because one loses the 
possibility to perform, and thus explore, a rich range of affective states. Note what the pianist 
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Cristina Ortiz said in an interview at the 2012 Leeds piano competition: “Somebody took a 
piano from me, it would be my death, because I live through the piano. Whatever happens in 
my life—depression, pressure, happiness, or the loss of mother or father … I go to the piano, 
and my soul comes through [the] pieces I choose to portray that emotion.”3 It does not seem 
exaggerated to say that the regular performance of music can create an addictive relationship. 
How exactly this happens is, again, an empirical question. The act of playing an instrument 
affects posture and gestures, autonomic activity, and experience (see, for example, Davidson, 
2012; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009) and influences well-being (Croom, 2012). In addition, 
the mere ability to play an instrument can influence how one chooses to cope with situations. 
For example, rather than taking a tranquillizer or talking with others, the musician may rather 
turn to her instrument to regulate her affective state. Knowing that she can do so may affect 
which situations and challenges she chooses to face, and in which way, and has thus general 
implications for the kind of person she ends up being. 
 We can now introduce some phenomenological distinctions that bring to light 
different varieties of entrenchment. We distinguish three forms of entrenchment: 
entrenchment into the corporeal schema; into the body image; and performative 
entrenchment. Let us consider these in turn.  
First, something is entrenched into the “corporeal schema” (see section 2) when it is 
implicitly integrated into one’s bodily activities such that it is not experienced as a separate 
object, but as part of oneself. Like the corporeal schema, the integrated resource is 
prereflective—i.e., not explicitly attended or reflected upon (even though it could become so 
with a shift of attention). Schull’s (2005) ethnographic study of gambling machines illustrates 
well how this form of entrenchment can characterize not just sensorimotor but also 
motivational-affective states. The gaming industry designs these machines to accelerate the 
customers’ rate of play and extend its duration as much as possible. Strategies include 
14	  
	  
making sure that the player is comfortable and can order food and drinks through the gaming 
system so that she does not need to leave the machine; providing a choice of different 
activities such as browsing, exploring, and experimenting with selections from a library of 
games; preventing players from knowing how much they are going to get and when, etc. The 
more recent machines also adapt to the customer’s rate of play, altering the payouts 
depending on the customer’s gambling style. As Schull shows, these machines induce an 
extreme state of absorption and isolation from the world and other people—commonly 
referred to by gamblers as “the zone”—in which the boundaries between subject and machine 
become blurred. One player reports, for example: “I feel connected to the machine when I 
play, like it’s an extension of me, as if physically you couldn’t separate me from the 
machine” (p. 76). Schull identifies an even further level of absorption, characterized by the 
disappearance of the materiality of the machine altogether. As another gambler says: “the 
machine isn’t even really there. … as you play the machine becomes less and less important; 
it starts out the machine and then it’s the game” (p. 77, italics in original). Cases like this 
seem to involve a total experiential transparency of the machine, where the materiality of 
both one’s body and tools for acting are passed over and forgotten.  
 Losing or being separated from corporeally entrenched resources makes one’s 
reliance on them apparent. A woman who generally goes out with her handbag reports that on 
those rare occasions when she leaves it at home, she has “the sensation that something is 
missing, that I am not complete. It’s a bit … like what it is said of amputated people, that they 
‘feel’ the absent limb. Without my bag, it’s as if I were amputated” (Kaufmann, 2011, p. 157, 
our translation). Similarly, some of us realize how dependent our daily mood and energy are 
on caffeine only when we stop drinking coffee or tea; people trying to stop smoking often 
become jittery and nervous, revealing the extent to which their normal functioning and 
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affective condition has come to incorporate specific habits (such as the very gesture of 
smoking) and chemicals.  
 Second, a material resource can also be integrated into the “body image,” the sense 
we have of how our body appears to others (Gallagher, 2005). For example, consider how 
this image can change depending on what we wear: a smart suit can make one feel self-
assured and businesslike, a short skirt can make one feel provocative or, depending on the 
context, exposed and vulnerable (see also, e.g., Woodward, 2006). Again, Kaufmann’s 
(2011) study shows that some women choose their handbag not so much on the basis of how 
it looks, but how it looks on them. The handbag corresponds to, and completes, a certain self-
styled body image: “I have chosen [my handbag] as a prolongation of my silhouette for a 
perfect image” (p. 124). 
 Third, by “performative entrenchment” we refer to yet a different form of 
incorporation, where the item in question is neither entirely transparent nor experienced like 
an external object. This mode of experiencing a material resource best characterizes the case 
of the professional musician and her relationship to the instrument. This dimension of 
incorporation can be clarified by contrast with the blind person and his cane. Unlike the cane, 
the musical instrument is not something through which something else (e.g., the surrounding 
environment) is perceived. Of course, it is likely that with practice the musician will pay less 
and less attention to the instrument while playing. We do not think it is appropriate to say, 
however, that the musician at some point comes to play unconsciously, as if she were on 
automatic pilot (see also Montero, 2010). Certainly she acquires many sensorimotor 
automatisms. But she needs to remain aware of how she is playing—if not of specific motor 
actions, at least of her expressive gestures, of the expressive character of the music she is 
producing, and of the actions afforded by the instrument.  
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Our suggestion, then, is that the instrument in the hands of the skilful musician is not 
experienced as an external object, but as an integrated part of what Legrand (2007) calls the 
performative body. As Legrand characterizes it, the performative body is neither entirely 
transparent nor an intentional object of experience. Rather, it is the body as experienced 
during the skilful performance of a specific activity. In these cases, one need not 
deliberatively attend to one’s body—but one is nevertheless still very much aware of its 
presence and activity, primarily via prereflective proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations 
(i.e., sensations of bodily position and movement that are not, but could become, explicitly 
attended to). In the case of expert musical performance, we suggest, the instrument becomes 
entrenched into this performative complex; it is neither entirely transparent nor explicitly 
attended to, but is nevertheless experienced as a very present instrument of performance and 
expression.  
 
4. Interpersonal Scaffolds of Affectivity  
 
Like the domain of material objects, the interpersonal domain is a realm that we actively 
manipulate to alter our affective states. We spend time with partners, family, and friends 
because we enjoy their company and the pleasant feelings they bring about, and we engage in 
joint activities that are qualitatively enriched by the presence of others. We now show how 
the dimensions of trust and individualization/entrenchment can be fruitfully applied to the 
interpersonal domain.  
 
4.1. Trust 
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As is the case with material resources, we trust some people more than others; and again, the 
sense of “trust” we have in mind here refers to the expectation that others will have a certain 
modulatory impact on our affective life.  
 Trust in this sense is directly proportional to familiarity. If we are uncertain about 
how certain others might respond to us, we will approach them in a guarded way; as 
familiarity increases, so do trust and reliance. Part of the reason we experience intimacy with 
family and friends is because we know what sort of affective feedback we can expect from 
them. For example, based on previous interactions, we know which member of the family to 
turn to for the affirmation needed to elevate our mood, or which friend to call if we need a 
good laugh.  
 As with material objects, trust in the interpersonal domain need not involve the 
conscious or reflective expectation of how others will respond. Rather, trust is often a matter 
of prereflective patterns of reliance. People in long-standing relationships, for example, 
develop habitual patterns of affective responsiveness to one another (for better or for worse). 
Or consider cases in which the emotions of an individual “come out” only when he is part of 
a group of a certain kind (Wilson, 2004, calls this phenomenon “social manifestation”). One 
way this may happen is via “bottom-up” mechanisms of emotional contagion (see discussion 
in Parkinson et al., 2005, chap. 4), which are largely automatic. In this way, members of a 
group may provide ongoing resources and feedback that scaffold the experience and 
expression of emotions unique to a certain context, irrespective of the individual’s intentions 
and deliberations (see Goldstein, 2002, for a relevant study of group aggressiveness). Yet 
another illustration of the unreflective, non-deliberate social manifestation of emotion are so-
called audience effects. It has been shown that people’s expressions of emotion change 
significantly depending on whether or not they are facing an audience. For example, people 
rarely smile when they are alone; rather, they smile almost exclusively when facing others 
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(Kraut & Johnston, 1979; Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997). This is even the case for 
young infants (Jones et al., 1991). As Griffiths & Scarantino (2009) point out, this evidence 
supports the view that smiles are not simply individual responses to a positively evaluated 
situation, but social signals aimed to have an effect on the audience (see also Parkinson et al., 
2005). Expressive behavior such as smiling, crying, or blushing are thus ways of 
manipulating others—manipulations which require a degree of trust in the predictability of 
their responses.  
Note also that these interpersonal manipulations are not only present in adulthood. 
Similar patterns are already evident in how infants interact with their caregivers. There is 
ample empirical evidence from developmental psychology that newborns and young infants 
require organized patterns of auditory, visual, and tactile information (exaggerated facial 
expressions, gestures, sing-song speech, manipulation of interpersonal space, etc.) to regulate 
their attention and emotion (Beebe & Gerstman, 1984; Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Young 
infants lack the endogenous resources needed to control attention and cultivate positive affect 
voluntarily; the regulation of their emotion is thus delegated to the caregiver, who redirects 
attention by stimulating, soothing, restraining, and so on. Mothers, for example, jiggle the 
baby while breastfeeding to scaffold their attention and motivation. As the baby grows, 
caregivers discourage inappropriate behavior, and encourage appropriate behavior, by 
redirecting attention with bodily and vocal gestures (see Krueger, 2013). Importantly, 
however, it is not just the caregiver who manipulates the infant’s affective state; the infant 
also plays an active role in shaping the interaction and thus can also be said to participate in 
the construction of a specific infant-caregiver affective niche. For example, in the first weeks 
and months of life, infants are already perceptually sensitive and responsive to the 
contingencies and temporal patterns of face-to-face social interactions (Tronick et al., 1979). 
From birth, infants seem to trust familiar caregivers to respond to them in predictable ways; 
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they recognize them as reliable sources of affectively salient feedback, much in the way that 
we gravitate toward our own trustworthy resources as adults. Infants selectively imitate faces, 
but not objects such as puppets (Legerstee, 1991); they only give full greeting responses to 
people, not inanimate objects (Tronick, 1989).4 Preverbal infants as young as three months 
appear capable of assessing social behavior, showing a preference for individuals who 
reliably help others (i.e., trustworthy individuals) versus those who hinder others’ behavior 
and are thus less predictable (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2010). From a very early age, infants are 
thus differentially sensitive to affective resources. They exhibit different degrees of trust to 
different kinds of stimuli and tailor their patterns of interaction accordingly. 
This sensitivity is particularly manifest when infant-caregiver interactions go awry. 
Consider cases where infants temporarily lose trust in their caregivers as reliable and 
predictable sources of affective modulation. For example, when the temporal structure and 
predictability of infant-caregiver interactions are disrupted—e.g., when caregivers fail to 
respond to the infant’s solicitations and instead present an inexpressive “still face” (Tronick, 
2003); or when the timing of the exchange is artificially disrupted, such as when caregiver 
and infant are interacting over an intentionally delayed closed-circuit video system (Murray 
& Trevarthen, 1985)—infants indicate that they no longer trust the regulatory feedback from 
these external sources. They disengage, become distressed, and turn to self-stimulation 
strategies to try and manage their own affective states (Manian & Bornstein, 2009). Once the 
caregiver reengages with the infant, however, the bond of trust is quickly repaired and the 
infant continues to approach the caregiver as a reliable and predictable source of affective 
modulation.  
Sometimes, however, loss of trust is long-lasting. An enduring loss of trust and its 
impact on infants’ selection of affective scaffolding can be observed in longer-term studies of 
infants of clinically depressed mothers (see Varga & Krueger, 2013). Due to their depression, 
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the clinically depressed mothers typically provide diminished affective feedback via facial 
expression, posture, and tone of voice compared to their non-depressed counterparts. 
Evidence shows that their infants are less responsive to faces and voices generally (Field et 
al., 2009); their infants quickly learn that faces are not reliable sources of affective feedback, 
and they begin to look elsewhere for the stimulation they crave. In addition, at 3-6 months, 
infants of depressed mothers show less negative responding to their mothers’ non-contingent 
and still-face behaviors than do infants of non-depressed mothers (op. cit.). By now they 
seem to have become accustomed to diminished maternal feedback—they are accustomed to 
their particular impoverished affective niche such that it no longer bothers them as much as it 
once did—but they still also exhibit a more general deficit in discriminating fine facial 
expressions in others (e.g., neutral versus smiling) (Bornstein et al., 2011). In other words, 
the infants have learned not only to distrust their mother’s face but also the faces of others, 
and their ability to read facial expressions of emotion has suffered accordingly. The point of 
this work, we propose, is that, much the same way that adults often abandon untrustworthy 
affective scaffolding that does not provide reliable feedback (e.g., unpredictable friends with 
wild mood swings, uncomfortable environments we cannot control), so, too, do infants 
already from an early age abandon unreliable resources and look elsewhere for affective 
modulation—such as turning to various self-soothing strategies (Manian & Bornstein, 2009) 
when their primary source of interpersonal scaffolding proves to be untrustworthy. 
Taken together, this evidence in our view indicates that infants’ affective 
responsiveness to human adults has an element of active selection. Infants pick out and 
respond to signals from agents whom they trust, and they are likely to keep providing 
sustained and varied feedback motivating the interaction as long as their expectations are met. 
When they no longer trust their sources of feedback (i.e., infants of depressed mothers), 
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however, they actively look elsewhere for stimulation. In this sense, infants—like adults—
can also be said to manipulate their interpersonal environment to scaffold their affective life. 
 
4.2. Individualization and Entrenchment 
Recall that Sterelny’s (2010) second dimension refers to resources that are individualized so 
significantly that they become entrenched within the individual’s cognitive repertoire, 
whereas others are interchangeable and thus less deeply entrenched. This dimension also 
applies to the affective realm in the interpersonal domain. As noted in section 3.2, 
individualization is closely related to trust. The more one trusts, and accordingly relies on, a 
certain resource, the more individualized it becomes; vice versa, the more individualized and 
thus entrenched the resource is, the more trusted and relied upon it becomes. We also saw in 
the previous section that we tend to trust familiar people more than less familiar ones, and we 
therefore allow the former to regulate our emotional responses more immediately than we do 
the latter.  
We now suggest that the dimension of individualization and entrenchment also 
applies to the degree to which a certain “style” of affective interaction comes to characterize 
specific interpersonal relations. We have in mind what both Husserl (1912/1989) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) identify as an individual’s bodily-affective style: their overall 
characteristic manner of comportment, including distinctive ways of speaking, gesturing, 
moving, etc. (Meacham, 2013). Important for our purposes is the fact that one’s style is not 
fixed; rather, we exhibit different styles in different niches. For example, contrast how one’s 
style transforms when teaching a classroom full of undergraduates, say, versus interacting 
with one’s partner or children, meeting professional colleagues for the first time, or going out 
for the evening with a group of old friends. Certain styles only seem to manifest—to use 
Wilson’s (2004) term again—when scaffolded by the presence of specific social groups. 
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In adopting (both voluntarily and involuntarily) distinctive styles, we contribute to the 
construction and maintenance of different affective niches. Consider the role that humor, as 
an aspect of one’s style, plays in establishing relationships. Humor is a tool for interpersonal 
niche construction. We adapt our humor (the content of our jokes, comments, level of irony 
and sarcasm, extravagance of our facial and gestural displays, etc.) to different interpersonal 
contexts. Importantly, we do this not only to accommodate social and cultural norms, such as 
expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior at work versus a more casual 
context. We also regulate our humor-related style to carve out a specific niche within these 
contexts—that is, to establish certain patterned interactions with others that will in turn shape 
the ongoing affective character of our future engagements with them. So, with long-term (i.e., 
familiar and trusted) friends, for example, we gradually generate a rich repertoire of shared 
jokes, anecdotes, and experiences. Thanks to our interactive history, we easily slip into 
familiar sequences of humorous expressions that prompt predictable responses from our 
friends, which shape our subsequent response, which in turn shapes theirs, and so on. We 
know how to “get a rise” out of our friends, and they us; and crucially, we also know how 
their responses will impact our responses and affective experiences. Over time, then, this 
familiarity breeds the trust, intimacy, and openness that are the affective hallmarks of a strong 
friendship. We feel at home in these relationships because we have, to a certain extent, 
individualized them. By adopting particular styles—which may transform and adapt over 
time as other members, each with their own style, enter or leave the group and change its 
dynamic—we thus play an active role in shaping the way that our interpersonal relationships 
function as reliable affective scaffoldings.  
 To clarify further how we individualize and become entrenched in different affective 
niches within the interpersonal domain, we can return to a previous point and speak here of 
degrees of phenomenological transparency. Most of the time we navigate different aspects of 
23	  
	  
the social world (our face-to-face encounters with others, as well as the various norms, 
expectations, and patterned practices that constitute the backdrop against which these 
encounters unfold) in a skillful and unreflective way. We inhabit and relate to the social 
world transparently (see also Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). This transparency is further 
highlighted by the ways our bodily-affective style emerges spontaneously as we move 
through different interpersonal contexts (e.g., speaking to the boss at work, eating lunch with 
colleagues, having a friendly chat with a stranger in the neighborhood market). Much like an 
experienced carpenter uses his tools in a skillful way without reflective deliberation, so, too, 
we exhibit a practical understanding of how to negotiate different social contexts. Of course, 
we may in some cases need to reflect on, and intentionally calibrate, our affective displays to 
others, such as when we are with a group of strangers. However, with those we know best, in 
the interpersonal niches we have most fully individualized, we tacitly negotiate different 
affective styles without reflective deliberation.   
 Again,  the fact that our social interactions are ordinarily transparent can be made 
apparent by considering when that transparency is compromised or missing altogether. This 
is the case, for example, of individuals with schizophrenia. Among other things, they often 
find other people puzzling and unpredictable (Lysaker et al., 2005). They say things like: “I 
simply cannot grasp what the others do”; “When I am with others … I cannot express myself. 
I don’t lack the words: I lack something else… a piece of the situation” (Stanghellini & 
Ballerini, 2011, p. 187). Individuals with schizophrenia cannot interact smoothly with others, 
either; social movements like gestures and facial expressions lose their fluidity and 
spontaneity, taking on an unnaturally stiff and calculated character (e.g., de Haan & Fuchs, 
2010). Disorders of bodily self-awareness further impact their ability to express a consistent 
bodily-affective style, which in turn influences how other people relate to them. It is thus 
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difficult for people with schizophrenia to individualize interpersonal relationships and 
become entrenched within them.   
Finally, as with trust, we do not think that only adults individualize their interactions. 
To return to developmental studies, we can see that instances of affective individualization 
and entrenchment are already apparent in the first few months of life. For example, the shape 
and form of infants’ affective displays differ relative to the interpersonal scaffolding available 
in different contexts. Different interactive contexts have distinct (i.e., individualized) 
features: specific dynamics, lengths, patterns of temporal coordination, peaks of high arousal 
and neutral states, etc. Five month-olds infants’ interactions with their mother, for instance, 
usually contain one peak high arousal and several neutral states, while interactions with their 
father contain several peaks but are of shorter duration (Feldman, 2007). Six- to twelve 
month-olds display mostly Duchenne smiles (raised lip corners and raised cheeks) when 
greeting their mother after a short separation, and non-Duchenne smiles (including e.g. 
dropped jaws) when greeting strangers (Fogel et al., 2006). These studies suggest that infants 
quickly learn that different people will provide distinct forms of affectively salient feedback, 
and they adapt their responses accordingly. Even very young infants thus play a role in 
shaping the individual dynamics of different affective niches; they develop bodily-affective 
styles unique to these distinct encounters—e.g., more extravagant displays with mom, more 
subdued with dad—and thus contribute to the gradual individualization of certain patterns of 
interactivity (i.e., the construction of specific interpersonal affective niches). When 
interacting with trusted caregivers who exhibit predictable patterns of touch, familiar sounds, 
smells, vocalizations, etc., it is plausible that infants will allow themselves to “settle into” this 
affective scaffolding even more and, in so doing, individualize it to a greater degree. Think 
about how quickly a fussy infant allows herself to be calmed once she is back in the familiar 
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scaffolding of her mother’s arms, as opposed to the “interchangeable” (to use Sterelny’s 
term) scaffolding of an unfamiliar stranger.   
 
5. The Interplay of Material and Interpersonal Affective Scaffoldings 
 
To conclude, we now briefly discuss how material and interpersonal scaffoldings can 
constrain one another, and in particular how items of material culture can scaffold the 
affective states not only of individuals but of social groups as well (recall, by comparison in 
the cognitive domain, the example of the role of plots in Elizabethan theatre discussed in 
section 2). The topic of how material culture contributes to shaping people is of course 
central to sociology, and one that has been highlighted in several contexts (consumer 
societies, the military, mental institutions, etc.). As we do not have room to address this 
whole area of inquiry here, we offer only one example that illustrates the point nicely and is 
specific to affectivity: religious and spiritual contexts. These contexts harbor spaces that are 
often designed to induce a variety of feelings—faith, hope, awe, love, compassion, guilt, 
etc.—with the aid of disparate material objects and practices. Thus consider, for example, the 
transformations that some churches have recently undergone to adapt to the changing 
affective needs of worshippers. In the early 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church changed the 
practice of celebrating the Eucharist. Traditionally, the priest had his back to the 
congregation, appearing to lead the people; after the change he moved behind the altar and 
faced the congregation, appearing to be in dialogue with the people. Furthermore, in some 
churches, the altar (often made of wood rather than stone, thus signifying a table for a 
communal meal rather than a sacrificial table) has migrated from the distant and elevated area 
of the chancel, to the middle of the nave at the same level of the congregation, where it is 
often surrounded on all sides by pews (Taylor, 2004, p. 52). This new arrangement answers 
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the communal need for a more direct and equal relationship with the priest and God; at the 
same time, it also strengthens the sense of sharing and community among worshippers. Or 
consider the church of KingsGate, which opened in the UK in 2010, in a modern building that 
looks like a shopping center. Inside, the church looks like a theatre, with comfortable chairs 
on a slope, facing a stage, and no religious symbols. On Sundays, mass is celebrated with live 
rock music, and worshippers stand and sing along; the only traditional icon on display is a 
cross on stage. This church thus appears to have adapted to the desires and preferences of a 
certain group of 21st-century Catholics, organizing spaces and rituals to answer their 
affective needs, and to kindle and support their feelings of faith, devotion, and togetherness.  
Importantly, these examples do not only show how material items and other people 
can interact to construct specific affective niches; they also point to the “intergenerational” 
character of (affective) niche construction (see section 1). The manipulation of the physical 
layout of the church accommodates a collective desire for, e.g., heightened intimacy and a 
personalized form of worship in a certain group of people, and also influences the experience 
and expectations of subsequent generations of worshippers inhabiting that space. Some 
affective niches are thus built gradually over time, and their material and social dimensions 
slowly constrain one another over generations, leading to culturally and socially different 
affective experiences and modalities of conduct.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have applied Sterelny’s (2010) dimensional analysis of the scaffolded mind to the realm 
of affectivity, showing the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally 
scaffolded by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. Our main goal has 
been to describe these scaffoldings in some detail, illustrating them with examples from 
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empirical work in different disciplines, and also developing phenomenological considerations 
to distinguish various ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Our analysis is 
meant to: (i) extend the debate on the “extended” and/or “scaffolded” mind from its almost 
exclusive focus on cognition to the domain of affectivity; and (ii) rejoin and further develop 
the “situated” approach to emotion (Parkinson et al., 2005; Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009) by 
emphasizing the process of active manipulation of the material and social world for the 
purposes of regulating one’s affective condition (what we have referred to as the construction 
of affective niches).  
 Ultimately, the goal of a situated and scaffolded approach to affectivity is to move 
away from the widespread tendency of mainstream affective science to provide internalist 
explanations of how emotional states occur: namely, explanations that refer primarily, or 
even exclusively, to mechanisms located inside individual organisms (affect programs, 
cognitive appraisals, etc.). These accounts usually reduce the world to a causal background 
that is not factored in when it comes to explaining how emotions come about. Recognizing 
the scaffolded nature of affectivity thus ought to redirect attention to its material and 
interpersonal contexts, and in so doing shift the explanatory emphasis from exclusively 
internal processes to external ones as well. We think that such an explanatory shift should 
involve an interdisciplinary approach that gives a more prominent role, in affective science, 
to social sciences such as sociology and anthropology. Certainly more needs to be done to 
show how sociology and anthropology can impact explanatory frameworks and methods in 
affective science. For now, however, our hope is that the discussion in this paper has 
provided one step in this direction, even if only a limited and preliminary one.  
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Notes 
 
1 Aside from Griffiths & Scarantino (2009), there is little work in the philosophy of situated 
cognition that addresses affectivity. Of the 26 chapters of The Cambridge Handbook of 
Situated Cognition (Robbins & Aydede, 2009), Griffiths & Scarantino’s is the only one that 
does so. The literature on ExM has also been concerned primarily with cognition (see, e.g., 
Clark, 2008; Rowlands, 2008; Menary, 2010b), with some recent exceptions (Stephan et al., 
2013; Colombetti & Roberts, 2014; Krueger 2014; Slaby 2014). 
2 Sutton (2006), Wilson & Clark (2010), and Menary (2010a) identify further dimensions of 
situated cognition that could also be applied to affectivity. Sutton (2006) provides an 
especially helpful high-level taxonomy of resources that scaffold cognitive but also 
potentially affective processes—e.g., external cultural tools, artefacts, and symbols systems; 
natural environmental resources; interpersonal scaffolding; embodied skills and capacities—
as well as a consideration of various dimensions and times-scales along which these 
resources vary (enduring versus one-off scaffoldings, etc.). Here we focus only on Sterelny’s 
account, mainly for reasons of space, and we do not claim that our dimensional analysis of 
scaffolded affectivity is exhaustive. 
3http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQurNBRu9m4&list=PL2kzIPyOVx7BCXM_rG_zy1H
QPQEIVDlV8 (accessed November 7, 2013). 
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4 There is evidence that older children are responsive to “socially intelligent robots” (e.g., 
Dautenhahn, 2007). Yet this evidence does not undermine our point, as these robots 
reproduce important features of human agency, which can explain why children trust and 
engage with them (socially intelligent robots can express and/or perceive emotions, 
distinguish agents from objects, and reliably use natural cues—gaze, facial expressions, 
gestures, etc.—to exhibit distinctive personalities and evoke social responses from others).  
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